DKDKCISSP
DNS Infrastructure Compromise — Rogue Certificates

Three country registries were hijacked and attackers got real HTTPS certificates for Google domains

Attackers took over the .gh, .sl and .as registries, changed authoritative DNS, and obtained valid certificates for Google names and other organisations. No website was breached and no browser warning would have appeared. How the registries were compromised has not been disclosed.

Registries hijacked
3 (.gh, .sl, .as)
Google systems compromised
No, per Google
Awareness to disclosure
About 1 week
Certificates issued
Not published
How the registries were breached
Not disclosed

Background

A website certificate is issued after the requester proves control of the domain. Most of the time that proof is a DNS check or a file at the domain. So whoever controls a domain's DNS answers can pass the check, even if they never touch the real site.

A country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), such as .gh for Ghana, .sl for Sierra Leone or .as for American Samoa, is run by a registry. The registry decides which name servers answer for every domain below it. That makes a registry a very high-value place to break into.

From a registry to a trusted certificate

Registries for .gh, .sl and .as compromisedMethod not disclosedAuthoritative DNS records changedAttackers now answer for the domainsDomain-control check passed at the CAThe CA did nothing wrong, says GoogleValid certificates for Google and othersCount and victims not publishedBlocked in Chrome and revokedAnnounced Oct 6, 2026
Fig. 1 — The weak point was upstream of every website and every certificate authority.

What actually happened

On 6 October 2026 Google's Chrome Secure Web and Networking team said attackers had hijacked three country-code registries: .gh (Ghana), .sl (Sierra Leone) and .as (American Samoa). During the hijacks the attackers changed authoritative DNS records and obtained unauthorised HTTPS certificates covering several Google domains and domains belonging to other organisations.

Google said its own systems were not compromised, and that it had no reason to believe the certificate authorities that issued the certificates had done anything wrong. The reporting describes why that matters: the attacker controls where traffic goes and holds the private key for the certificate, so a visitor sees a normal padlock and no warning.

Chrome blocked the suspected certificates for Google properties through CRLSets, its emergency block list, and Google worked with the issuing authorities to have them revoked so users of other browsers were protected too. Certificate Transparency (CT) logs then showed further affected organisations, described only as several leading global brands and widely used online services. Google blocked those certificates in Chrome and contacted organisations where it could, but did not name them or give a number.

Google warned that browser blocking should not be relied on: it cannot guarantee it found every affected domain, and Chrome's protection does not reliably cover other browsers.

Still unknown: how the registries were broken intoThe reporting we read does not say how the attackers took over the three registries, who they are, how many certificates were issued, which other organisations were affected, or whether any user was actually intercepted. Some secondary sites give certificate counts and dates, but they do not appear in the two reports we could read, so we have left them out.

Root cause

Confirmed
  • Attackers compromised the registries for .gh, .sl and .as and changed authoritative DNS records, per Google.
  • They obtained unauthorised HTTPS certificates for several Google domains and for other organisations' domains, per Google.
  • Google's systems were not compromised, and Google has no reason to believe the issuing certificate authorities acted improperly, per Google.
  • Certificate issuance depended on a domain-control check that DNS control can pass, per the Infosecurity Magazine and Register reporting.
Reasonable hypothesis — not confirmed
  • The registries may have been reached through a shared provider, stolen credentials or a registrar-level weakness. The sources say nothing about this, so it is a guess.
  • The same attackers may be behind all three hijacks. Google described them as a series, but attribution has not been given.
  • Certificates for a Google domain were probably tested for interception or brand abuse. The Register notes that is the obvious use, but nobody has reported actual victims.

Timeline

Attackers gain control of three country-code registries. Method and dates not disclosed.
T1584 · Compromise Infrastructure
Authoritative DNS answers for domains below .gh, .sl and .as are altered.
T1584.002 · DNS Server
Certificate authorities see the attacker's DNS answers, pass the domain-control check and issue valid certificates.
T1649 · Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Google says it learned of the attacks the week before its announcement.
Chrome blocks suspect certificates through CRLSets and Google works with the issuing authorities on revocation.
Google publishes guidance for domain owners: monitor CT logs, set restrictive CAA records.
Fig. 2 — The reporting gives the end of the story. The start is not public.

Detection

How it was discovered

Google says it became aware of the attacks about a week before its 6 October announcement. How it found them has not been explained. CT logs then showed further affected organisations.

Time to detect

Unknown. Certificate issuance dates and the start of the registry compromise were not published.

Warning signs that were missed
  • Unexpected DNS changes at the registry level are not visible to ordinary domain owners.
  • New certificates for names under the affected domains, which are visible in public CT logs for anyone who watches them.

What to monitor for in your own environment

A certificate issued for one of your names that you did not request, including parked and regional domains

Certificate Transparency logs and monitoring alerts

A change in the authoritative name servers or records for a regional domain you own

Independent DNS monitoring from outside your own provider

A certificate issued by a CA or account that your CAA record does not list

CT logs compared against your CAA policy

Registry or registrar change notices, if your provider offers them

Registrar account notifications

Containment, eradication & recovery

Containment

Late Sept – Oct 6
  • Chrome blocked suspected unauthorised certificates across the affected domains through CRLSets.
  • Google worked with the issuing certificate authorities to revoke the certificates so non-Chrome users were protected.
  • Google blocked certificates for further affected organisations found through CT logs, and contacted them where possible.

Eradication

Not disclosed
  • How the three registries were secured again has not been published.
  • Google advised restoring restrictive CAA records after a hijack ends, so an attacker cannot reuse cached domain-control checks to obtain new certificates.

Recovery

From Oct 6
  • Domain owners were told to review recent CT entries for .gh, .sl and .as domains.
  • Google said it is working on shorter certificate lifetimes and less reuse of domain-control validation across the web.
  • Google warned that its own analysis may not have found every affected domain.

Security control analysis

Failed
Registry access control and change monitoring

Attackers changed authoritative DNS for three country-code registries. The method has not been disclosed.

Partial
Domain-control validation by certificate authorities

The checks worked as designed, which is the problem. DNS control passes them. Google says the CAs did nothing wrong.

Held
Certificate Transparency logging

Issuance was logged, which let Google and others find further affected organisations.

Partial
Browser-side blocking

Chrome blocked the certificates it found, but Google says it may not have found all of them and that other browsers are not reliably covered.

Unknown
Domain owners' own CT monitoring and CAA records

Not reported whether any victim had alerts or restrictive CAA records in place.

Partial
Disclosure to affected organisations

Google contacted affected organisations where it could, but has not named them or said how many.

Controls that would have prevented or limited this

Fix
Watch Certificate Transparency logs for every domain you own, including parked and regional ones, and alert on any certificate you did not order

A rogue certificate would reach a person within minutes of issuance, not weeks.

Closes: Domain owners' own CT monitoring and CAA recordsCIS Control 13 — Network Monitoring and Defense
Fix
Publish restrictive CAA records that name allowed CAs, and bind them to your own ACME account and validation method

After a hijack ends, an attacker cannot reuse cached validation to obtain more certificates.

Closes: Domain-control validation by certificate authoritiesCIS Control 12 — Network Infrastructure Management
Fix
Monitor authoritative DNS answers for your domains from outside your own provider, and alert on changes

A hijack of name servers above you would show up as an unexpected answer.

Closes: Registry access control and change monitoringCIS Control 13 — Network Monitoring and Defense
Fix
Choose registrars and registries with strong access controls, registry locks and change notification, and ask about them

Reduces the chance one upstream break-in rewrites your DNS silently.

Closes: Registry access control and change monitoringCIS Control 15 — Service Provider Management
Fix
Plan for rogue certificates: know how to revoke, how to notify customers and how to pin or monitor critical endpoints

You can respond in hours instead of working it out during the incident.

Closes: Disclosure to affected organisationsCIS Control 17 — Incident Response Management

Blast radius

What was exposed

  • Domains below .gh, .sl and .as, which were at risk while DNS was under attacker control
  • Several Google domains and domains of other organisations, which received unauthorised certificates
  • Users who reached a hijacked name on a browser that did not block the certificates

What was not reported as affected

  • Google's own systems, per Google
  • The certificate authorities, which Google says did nothing wrong
  • Any confirmed interception of user traffic. None has been reported.
Fig. 3 — The reach was defined by who relied on the three registries, not by who ran a vulnerable website.

What we know about timing

Registry compromise → Google awareUnknownGoogle aware → public disclosureAbout 1 weekCertificates issuedNumber not published
Fig. 4 — The one measured gap is the week from awareness to disclosure. The dangerous period before it is unknown.

What they got right

Google found the attacks, blocked the certificates in Chrome and worked with the issuing authorities to revoke them.

It published practical advice for domain owners instead of only reassurance, and said plainly that browser blocking is not enough.

It was honest that its analysis may not have found every affected domain.

Certificate Transparency did its job, so unauthorised issuance left a public trail.

Why this keeps happening

Domain control is the proof of identity for certificates, so anyone who controls DNS can pass it.

Registries sit above every domain owner, who cannot see or stop a change made there.

Few organisations watch CT logs for parked and regional domains, so a rogue certificate there goes unseen.

Lessons for your own environment

  1. DNS control is identity

    A certificate authority cannot tell a real owner from someone who controls the DNS answers. Treat your DNS provider and registry as part of your trust chain.

  2. Watch CT logs for every name you own

    Parked and regional domains are the quiet ones. A free alert on new certificates turns weeks of blindness into minutes.

  3. Lock issuance with CAA and ACME binding

    Google says it cannot stop issuance during an active hijack, but it stops reuse of cached validation afterward.

  4. Do not rely on one browser's block list

    Chrome blocked what it found. Other clients are not reliably protected, and Google could not guarantee it found everything.

  5. Ask your providers about their own security

    You inherit your registrar's and registry's weaknesses. Ask about locks, change alerts and recovery before an incident.

  6. Say what you do not know

    How the registries were breached is unpublished. This study treats that as unknown rather than filling the gap.

CISO & board lessons

  • List every domain you own, including regional and parked ones, and who watches certificates for each.
  • Make CT-log monitoring and restrictive CAA records a baseline for all of them, with an owner.
  • Review the security of your registrars and DNS providers as you would any critical supplier.
  • Add a rogue-certificate scenario to your incident plans: revocation contacts, customer notice and who decides.
  • Do not treat browser block lists as a control. They are a backstop that you do not own.

Action plan

First 24 hours

  • Check CT logs for every name you own for certificates you did not order, starting with .gh, .sl and .as domains.
  • Confirm who can change DNS and registrar settings for your domains and that sign-ins use strong authentication.
  • Find out whether any domain you own sits under an affected registry.

First 7 days

  • Publish restrictive CAA records with ACME account and validation-method binding where you can.
  • Turn on CT alerting across the whole domain portfolio, including parked and regional names.
  • Ask your registrar and DNS provider about registry locks, change notification and incident contacts.

First 30 days

  • Add independent external DNS monitoring for critical domains.
  • Write and rehearse a rogue-certificate response: who revokes, who tells customers and how fast.
  • Move toward shorter-lived certificates and less reuse of validation, in line with Google's direction.

Could this happen in your organization?

  • Do you have a complete list of the domains you own, including regional and parked ones?
  • Would you know within hours if someone obtained a certificate for any of them?
  • Do your CAA records restrict issuance to named CAs and your own account?
  • Who can change your DNS or registrar settings, and how is that access protected?
  • Have you asked your registrar and registry how they protect against a takeover?
  • Do you have a written plan for a rogue certificate on a customer-facing name?

If this happened to you: what to ask, and what to say

Knowing the lesson isn’t the same as knowing what to do with it Monday morning. A security lead, a CISO, and a customer-facing team each need something different from this incident.

  • “Which of our domains does nobody watch for new certificates?”
    Parked and regional ones, usually.
  • “If an attacker controlled our DNS for a day, what could they get a certificate for?”
    Anything the CA validates by DNS, unless CAA restricts it.
  • “Who is told when a certificate is issued for one of our names?”
    A named person or mailbox, not nobody.
  • “What do our providers do to stop a registry-level takeover?”
    Ask for the answer in writing.
  • Explain the risk in plain terms.
    Control of the address book lets an attacker pass as us.
    “Whoever controls the records that say where our domain lives can obtain a valid padlock for it. In October attackers did this to three countries' registries and got certificates for Google names.”
  • Say what is and is not known.
    The method and the victim list are not public.
    “Google confirmed the hijacks and the rogue certificates. How the registries were breached, and who else was hit, has not been disclosed, and we are not guessing.”
  • Show what we are doing.
    Boards want a concrete baseline.
    “We watch certificate logs for every domain we own, restrict who may issue for them and have a plan for a rogue certificate on a customer-facing site.”
  • Tell customers what to do if their domain is affected.
    Be practical.
    “If you operate a .gh, .sl or .as domain, review recent certificate log entries for certificates you did not request, and tighten your CAA records.”
  • Say that the main service was not breached.
    Be precise.
    “Google said its own systems were not compromised. The attack was on DNS above the websites.”
  • Explain what changes.
    Concrete actions.
    “We now alert on any new certificate for our names and lock down who can issue them.”

References & confidence

  • ReportedInfosecurity Magazine — Attackers Hijack Three ccTLDs to Obtain Google Certificates (Oct 8, 2026) — Reports Google's Chrome team post of Oct 6, the CRLSet block and the CT and CAA advice.
  • ReportedThe Register — Attackers hijacked top-level domains, minted fake security certs for Google and other orgs (Oct 7, 2026) — Source for Google becoming aware the week before and for the point that no certificate warning would appear.
  • UnknownGoogle Chrome Secure Web and Networking team — Chrome's response to recent ccTLD registry hijacks — The primary post could not be reached from our environment, so we relied on the two reports above.
  • UnknownCertificate counts, dates and issuing CAs given by some secondary sites — Not in the sources we read, so excluded.
  • UnknownHow the registries were compromised — Not disclosed.
This case study is built entirely from public reporting on this incident — see References & confidence above for what's confirmed, reported, or still unconfirmed. Nothing here is an estimate or an illustrative placeholder.